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I. Problem
On October 10, 1985, United States military aircraft intercepted an
Egyptian airliner over the Mediterranean Sea and forced it to land at a
NATO base in Sicily. Among those on board were four Palestinians who
had recently surrendered after hijacking the Italian cruise ship Achille
Lauro and holding more than 400 persons hostage for three days. The
United States stated that it acted to prevent the hijackers from "fl[ying]
... to their freedom."' This incident brings into dramatic relief the
norms governing the actions that a state may permissibly take under in-
ternational law to apprehend suspected criminals who are not physically
within its jurisdiction. More directly, it forces a reexamination of the
previously established norm against the interception of civilian aircraft
by military forces.
A. The Crime and Jurisdiction
There are several preliminary matters which must be discussed before
these primary issues can be analyzed. The first is the hijackers' crime.
Although there is no international criminal law in the same sense in
which each country has its own municipal criminal code, international
law proscribes certain conduct and allows national courts and interna-
tional tribunals to punish such conduct when it occurs.2 The actions of
which the hijackers were accused clearly fall within that class of conduct.
* For an introduction to the incident methodology, see Reisman, Introduction to a New
Genre in the Study ofInternationalLaw, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1984) and Willard, Incidents:
An Essay in Method, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 21 (1984).
t J.D. Candidate, Yale University.
1. Hijacking of the Achille Lauro, Statement by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary, Oc-
tober 10, 1985, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1233 (1985) [hereinafter Statement by Press
Secretary].
2. I. BROWNI.IE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 561-64 (3d ed. 1979).
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First, those actions can be characterized as piracy. The 1958 Geneva
Convention on the High Seas defines piracy as:
Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private
aircraft, and directed:
(a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft;
(b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State.
3
While it may be contended that the taking of the Achille Lauro is not
included within this definition because there was no second vessel in-
volved or because the hijackers did not act for "private ends," customary
international law and the history of the enforcement of the norm against
piracy indicate that such a position is unfounded.
4
Second, the hijacking of the Achille Lauro falls within the United Na-
tions International Convention against the Taking of Hostages. The
Convention defines a hostage taker as:
Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to con-
tinue to detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the "hostage") in
order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovern-
mental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to
do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the
release of the hostage ... .5
Since the hijackers demanded the release of certain Palestinians jailed in
Israel,6 their actions violated the Convention. Both Egypt and the
United States are parties to the Convention and thus are obligated to
punish or extradite those who violate it.7
A more difficult question is that of jurisdiction over the hijackers.
Clearly, Italy had territorial jurisdiction based on the fact that the Achille
Lauro flew the Italian flag." The United States' jurisdictional claims are
more tenuous. The U.S. ultimately issued an arrest warrant for the hi-
3. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No.
5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, art. 15.
4. See McGinley, The Achille Lauro Affair-Implications for International Law, 52 TENN.
L. REv. 691, 694-700 (1985); see also L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 609 (H. Lauter-
pacht ed. 1955) ("If a definition is desired which really covers all such acts as are in practice
treated as piratical, piracy must be defined as every unauthorized act of violence against per-
sons or goods committed on the open sea either by a private vessel against another vessel or by
the mutinous crev or passengers against their own vessel." (italics omitted)).
5. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 245, U.N. Doe. A/34/46 (1979) [hereinafter Hostages Convention].
6. See infra text accompanying note 38.
7. Hostages Convention, supra note 5, at art. 8(1).
8. See 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122, art. 92 (1982) ("Ships
shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for
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jackers charging them with piracy and hostage taking.9 The universality
principle of jurisdiction' ° was apparently relied on for the piracy charge.
The strongest statement of support for this position in this context is
found in Judge Moore's dissenting opinion in the Lotus case:
[I]n the case of what is known as piracy by law of nations, there has been
conceded a universal jurisdiction, under which the person charged with the
offence may be tried and punished by any nation into whose jurisdiction he
may come.... Piracy by law of nations, in its jurisdictional aspects, is sui
generis.II
As for the second charge, the U.S. statute concerning hostage taking
12
was enacted in conjunction with the U.S. ratification of the Hostages
Convention. That Convention allows a party state to take jurisdiction
when the hostage "is a national of that State." 13 However, no jurisdic-
tion is conferred over hostage takers who are nationals of states not party
to the Convention. Since the hijackers were citizens of Lebanon, which
is not a signatory, 14 the Convention did not confer jurisdiction on the
United States. In addition to the piracy and hostage taking charges,
President Reagan on at least two occasions implied that the hijackers
would be charged with the murder of an American citizen.' 5 However, a
jurisdictional claim such as this based solely on the victim's nationality
would be contrary to the traditional U.S. position on this point 16 and was
not in fact made.
17
Ultimately, though, the principal issue raised by this incident is not
jurisdictional. In announcing the interception, the United States Presi-
dential Press Secretary stated that the goal of the operation was to "es-
in international treaties or in this Convention, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on
the high seas.").
9. See infra text accompanying notes 64-67.
10. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 304.
11. The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 70 (Sept. 7); see also
United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820) ("Robbery on the seas is consid-
ered as an offence within the criminal jurisdiction of all nations. It is against all, and punished
by all.").
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (Supp. 11 1984).
13. Hostages Convention, supra note 5, at art. 5(1)(d).
14. McGinley, supra note 4, at 711.
15. Chicago Illinois, Informal Exchange With Reporters, October 10, 1985, 21 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1222, 1223 (1985); Hijacking of the Achille Lauro, Remarks and a Ques-
tion-and-Answer Session With Reporters, October 11, 1985, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1234, 1236 (1985) [hereinafter Oct. 11 Press Conference].
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 30(2) (1965) ("A state does not have jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching
legal consequences to conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the grounds that the
conduct affects one of its nationals."). The Hostages Convention represents a limited excep-
tion to this rule.
17. Egypt, of course, would also have had grounds for asserting jurisdiction over the hi-
jackers. However, Egypt made no jurisdictional claims.
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cort [the Egyptian aircraft] to a location where the terrorists could be
apprehended by those with appropriate jurisdiction."' 18 Thus, the U.S.
claim to the right to intercept the plane in order to capture the hijackers
is independent of its jurisdictional claims. In order to analyze how the
U.S. claim regarding the legitimacy of its interception affected interna-
tional law, it is necessary first to define the applicable legal norms that
prevailed before the United States acted.
B. The Pre-Incident Norms
There are several precedents to the U.S. interception; the Achille
Lauro incident was not the first example of a state using force to bring a
criminal suspect from a sanctuary outside its borders to a jurisdiction
willing to try and punish that suspect. I9 The most renowned case is that
of Adolf Eichmann. 20 Eichmann was accused of having had primary
authority over the perpetration of Nazi war crimes against the Jews.
2I
He avoided prosecution at Nuremberg, and in 1960 was living in appar-
18. Statement by Press Secretary, supra note 1, at 1233. But see infra text accompanying
note 52 (report that original U.S. intention was to transport the hijackers to the U.S.
immediately).
19. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, other incidents include: Ker v. Illinois,
119 U.S. 436 (1886) (Ker, accused of larceny and embezzlement in Illinois, was abducted in
Peru by an American private detective. The detective had proper extradition papers but did
not use them because Peru was under occupation by Chile. The Supreme Court upheld Ker's
conviction by an Illinois court. There was no Peruvian protest.); Ex parte Soblen, [1963] 2
Q.B. 243 (Accused of espionage by the U.S., Soblen fled to Israel. Israel turned him over to
U.S. agents. While on a plane to the U.S., Soblen stabbed himself, forcing the plane to land in
Britain. Although his offense was not extraditable there, British officials nonetheless deported
him to the U.S. See O'Higgins, Disguised Extradition: The Soblen Case, 27 MODERN L. REV.
521, 530-38 (1964).); the Argoud case (Argoud led a military revolt against the DeGaulle
government during the Algerian crisis. He was kidnapped by French agents in Munich in
February 1963 and taken to France, where he was sentenced to life imprisonment. West Ger-
many protested, but to no avail. See French Surrender ofArgoud Unlikely, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1,
1964, at 3, col. 5.); the case of Faik Bulut (Bulut, a Turkish citizen, was abducted during an
Israeli army raid 100 miles into Lebanon. He was tried as a civilian for the crime of belonging
to the Palestinian organization AI-Fatah, convicted, and sentenced to seven years imprison-
ment. See Israel. Self-Appointed Supercop, TIME, Aug. 20, 1973, at 31; see also Note, Extra-
territorial Jurisdiction and Jurisdiction Following Forcible Abduction: A New Israeli Precedent
in International Law, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1087 (1974).); the Vincenti case (In 1920, U.S. agents
kidnapped a U.S. citizen in the British West Indies and returned him to the U.S. When Britain
protested, the U.S. released Vincenti and apologized. See 1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 624 (1940).). See generally M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADI-
TION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE ch. V, § 2 (1983); M. BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 121-43 (1974); O'Higgins, Un-
lawful Seizure and Irregular Extradition, 36 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 279 (1960) [hereinafter Un-
lawful Seizure].
20. See generally H. ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY
OF EVIL (rev. ed. 1965); M. PEARLMAN, THE CAPTURE AND TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN
(1963); Lippman, The Trial of Adolf Eichmann and the Protection of Universal Human Rights
Under International Law, 5 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1 (1982).
21. Lippmann, supra note 20, at 2-4.
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ent safety in Argentina.22 But on May 11, 1960, members of the Israeli
Security Service apprehended Eichmann in Buenos Aires. After being
interrogated for a week, Eichmann was flown to Israel where he was
tried, convicted, and executed for crimes against the Jewish people,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
23
Argentina protested the abduction and demanded that Israel return
Eichmann and extradite those who kidnapped him. Israel sent to Argen-
tina a diplomatic note that admitted that Argentina's sovereignty had
been violated but maintained that the "special significance" of the Eich-
mann case justified Israel's action.24 Unsatisfied by the Israeli response,
Argentina brought the matter to the U.N. Security Council. The Coun-
cil passed a resolution that neither condemned nor criticized Israel, but
requested that "appropriate reparation" be made to Argentina.25 The
U.S. representative, supported by France and Great Britain, stated in the
debate preceding the vote that he considered that "appropriate repara-
tion will have been made by ... the pending resolution taken together
with the statement of the Foreign Minister of Israel making apology on
behalf of the Government of Israel" and thus that upon the adoption of
the resolution "the incident will then be closed."
'26
Israel made another apology, but no "reparation. ' 27 The governments
of Israel and Argentina soon issued a joint statement announcing that
they regarded the matter as closed.28 On the whole, the resolution of the
Eichmann incident indicates that the international community, given the
22. Id. at 5-6. The Argentine government had an "impressive record for not extraditing
Nazi criminals." H. ARENDT, supra note 20, at 264.
23. Lippman, supra note 20, at 6, 15-17.
24. Id. at 7 (quoting note verbale dated 3 June 1960 from the Embassy of Israel in Buenos
Aires to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Religion of the Argentine Republic, 15 U.N.
SCOR Supp. (Apr.-June) at 31-32, U.N. Doe. S/4342 (1960)).
25. Resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 868th meeting on 23 June 1960 con-
cerning the case of Adolf Eichmann, 15 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Apr.-June) at 35, U.N. Doc. S/
4349 (1960). The resolution also expressed "the concern of people in all countries that Eich-
mann should be brought to appropriate justice for the crimes of which he is accused." Id. The
Soviet Union and Poland abstained from the resolution, fearing that "adequate reparation"
might be interpreted to require Eichmann's return to Argentina. Lippman, supra note 20, at
11.
26. 15 U.N. SCOR (867th mtg.) at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.867 (1960); see also 15 U.N. SCOR
(868th mtg.) at 36, 49, U.N. Doc. S/PV.868 (1960) (statements of representatives of France
and Great Britain).
27. Had Israel's action indeed constituted a violation of international law, the reparation
owed to Argentina would have included the return of Eichmann. See O'Higgins, Unlawful
Seizure, supra note 19, at 295-96.
28. Lippman, supra note 20, at 11.
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"special significance" of the parties involved, acquiesced in and largely
approved of the Israeli action.
29
The facts of the second primary precedent for the Achille Lauro re-
sponse are even more similar to the U.S. action. On August 10, 1973,
Israeli fighter jets intercepted a Lebanese airplane over Beirut and forced
it to land at an Israeli military base. The Israelis believed that the Leba-
nese plane was carrying a Palestinian terrorist 30 responsible for a massa-
cre at the Athens airport the week before.3 It turned out, however, that
the individual sought by the Israelis was not on board, and the plane was
released.3
2
Like Argentina before it, Lebanon took the matter of the Israeli action
to the Security Council. The Council's response this time was unambigu-
ous. A resolution condemning the interception was adopted unani-
mously.33 The resolution stated that the Israeli action was a violation of
"the Charter of the United Nations, the international conventions on
civil aviation and the principles of international law and morality."
3 4
Thus, in the fall of 1985 it seems clear that an international norm ex-
isted against the diversion of civilian aircraft for the purpose of appre-
hending suspected criminals. Based on the Eichmann case, as well as
several others,35 however, it cannot be said that a strong norm had devel-
oped against the abduction of suspected criminals in cases not involving a
civilian plane. 36 The Achille Lauro incident forced a reappraisal of these
29. O'Higgins allows that the Eichmann abduction was ultimately legal, but does not ad-
mit the possibility that the incident affected the law. O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure, supra note
19, at 296 ("In conclusion all that one may say of this incident is that neither State denied that
the appropriate reparation for a seizure in violation of international law was restoration of the
person seized, and that the peculiar facts of the case either did not constitute a violation of
international law or excused a departure from the rule prima facie applicable.").
30. George Habbash, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Dayan
Identifies Hijacking Target, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1973, § 1, at 9, col. 1.
31. See Arabs Kill 3 and Wound 55 in Athens Airport Lounge, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1973,
§ 1, at 1, col. 6.
32. Smith, Israeli Jets Over Lebanon Force Down Arab Airliner, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11,
1973, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
33. S.C. Res. 337, 28 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. at 10, U.N. Doe. S/INF/29 (1973). The
resolution was submitted by France and Britain. 28 U.N. SCOR (1740th mtg.) at 3, U.N.
Doc. S/PV. 1740. Arab countries expressed disappointment that the resolution did not impose
sanctions. Id. at 13-14.
34. S.C. Res. 337, 28 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. at 10, U.N. Doc S/INF/29 (1973).
35. See supra note 19.
36. On the other hand, it may be argued that the primary distinction between the Eich-
mann abduction and Israel's 1973 interception was not that the latter involved an aircraft, but
that the former involved an infamous Nazi war criminal. Given the concern expressed in the
1973 Security Council debates over the special vulnerability of aircraft, though, I do not be-
lieve this explanation fully accounts for the divergent reactions to the two incidents. See, e.g.,
28 U.N. SCOR (1736th mtg.) at 111, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1736 (1973) (statement of U.S.S.R.
representative); 28 U.N. SCOR (1737th mtg.) at 12, 18, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1737 (1973) (state-
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norms. In order to evaluate the present effective international law in this
area, it is necessary to consider how international elites responded to the
U.S. interception.
II. Facts
On October 7, 1985, four armed Palestinians seized the Italian cruise
ship Achille Lauro off the coast of Egypt. The gunmen held over 400
passengers and crew hostage, 37 demanding that Israel free 50 jailed
Palestinians.3 8 After sailing to Syria and then Cyprus, both of which
refused it port rights, the ship anchored off Port Said, Egypt. There the
hijackers negotiated with ambassadors from Italy and West Germany as
well as with two Palestinians: Hani el-Hassan, an advisor to Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yassir Arafat, and Moham-
med Abul Abbas, 39 the leader of the pro-Arafat faction of the Palestine
Liberation Front (PLF).40 On October 9, the gunmen surrendered to
Egyptian authorities, who promised them safe passage out of the
country.
41
Once the hijackers surrendered and their hostages were released, it was
discovered that an American passenger, Leon Klinghoffer, had been
murdered and his body thrown overboard. 42 Although there had been
ments of U.K. and French representatives); 28 U.N. SCOR (1738th mtg.) at 59-61, U.N. Doe.
S/PV.1738 (1973) (statement of U.S. representative).
37. The ship had been carrying 680 passengers and 350 crew, but most of the passengers
had disembarked at Alexandria. Tagliabue, Ship Carrying 400 Is Seized; Hiackers Demand
Release of SO Palestinians in Israel, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
38. Id. It was later reported that the hijackers originally intended to attack Israelis after
disembarking when the ship reached Ashdod. They seized the Achille Lauro only after their
weapons were discovered by a crew member. Friedman, Port in Israel Described as Target of
Terrorists Who Seized Vessel, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at Al, col. 3. The attack on Ashdod
was intended to be in retaliation for the October 1, 1985, Israeli bombing of the PLO head-
quarters in Tunis, in which 60 people were killed. Id.
39. 45 FACTS ON FILE, at 754 (1985). Israeli officials later asserted that Abbas directed
the ship's hijacking. Friedman, Israelis Say Tape Ties Top PLO Aide to Ship Hijacking, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 17, 1985, at A12, col. 2. The U.S. also said that it was prepared to prove in court
that Abbas had helped plan the operation which led to the hijacking. Engelberg, U.S. Says It
Has Proof, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1985, at A12, col. 6. Abbas denied that he had anything to do
with the hijacking. Schumacher, P.L.O. Aide Bids U.S. Produce Evidence on Hjacking Link,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1985, at All, col. 1.
40. Smothers, Palestinian Guerrilla: Man of Many Factions, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985,
§ I, at 26, col. 1. The PLF was formed in 1976 as an offshoot of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command. In 1982 the PLF split into two factions, one, led
by Abbas, loyal to Arafat, and the other, led by Talaat Yacoub, allied with Syria. Id.; Italy:
Hijackers' Demands Outlined, Foreign Broadcast Information Service [hereinafter FBIS] (W.
Eur.), Oct. 8, 1985, at L2 (text from Madrid EFE). The hijackers were members of the Abbas
faction. Id.
41. The U.S. Sends a Message, TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 22, 25.
42. Dionne, Envoy Describes American's Death, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at AI, col 5.
The U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Nicholas A. Veliotes, reported that the hijackers had segre-
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reports on October 8 that one or two Americans had been killed,43 the
Egyptians claimed to have been unaware of the killing at the time they
negotiated the surrender, having relied on the ship captain's report that
everybody on board was safe.44 The hijackers and their supporters de-
nied that the murder had taken place,45 a PLO official calling it "a big lie
fabricated by the intelligence service of the United States."' 46 However,
Klinghoffer's body, with two gunshot wounds, was later recovered on the
Syrian coast and turned over to the United States.47
After the hijackers were in Egyptian custody 'and the killing was dis-
covered, Egypt expressed its intention to stick to its deal rather than to
try the hijackers or turn them over to Italy or the United States, 48 as the
U.S. urged.49 Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak reportedly asked
Arafat to find a country willing to accept the hijackers.50 On Thursday
gated the Americans and Jews on board and numbered the Americans to be executed if their
demands were not met. Miller, U.S. Ambassador Recounts Visit to Italian Cruise Ship, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 13, 1985, § 1, at 24, col. 5.
43. See Italy: Hostage Reportedly Killed, FBIS (W. Eur.), Oct. 8, 1985, at L7 (text from
Beirut Voice of Lebanon); Italy: Two Americans Reportedly Killed, FBIS (W. Eur.), Oct. 9,
1985, at L4 (text from Paris AFP).
44. Miller, Egyptian Defense, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at Al, col. 5. The captain later
said that he knew of the killing at the time but denied it because the hijackers held him at
gunpoint. Miller, supra note 42.
45. Schumacher, Palestinian Says Hiackers Told Him They Didn't Kill Anyone, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 14, 1985, at All, col. 2.
46. Sciolino, Palestinian Calls Charge of Killing 'a Big Lie', N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at
A12, col. 2.
47. Gwertzman, Hostage's Body Clearly Identified, With Signs of 2 Gunshot Wounds, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 17, 1985, at Al, col. 4. That this incident's known facts, as well as governmental
reactions, are to a degree a product of Middle Eastern political maneuverings is demonstrated
by the fact that Syria's "thoroughly uncharacteristic efficiency and cooperation" in announc-
ing the body's discovery and turning it over to the U.S. was seen as a calculated move meant to
embarrass Arafat. Friedman, A Double Blow toArafat, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1985, at Al, col.
5.
48. Miller, Hjackers Yield Ship in Egypt; Passenger Slain; 400 Are Safe; U.S. Assails Deal
With Captors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at Al, col. 6. The only extradition treaty arguably in
force between the U.S. and Egypt was made in 1874 with the Ottoman Empire, of which Egypt
was then a part. Convention between the United States of America and the Ottoman Empire,
Aug. 11, 1874, 19 Stat. 572, T.S. No. 270. Even if the U.S. had made a formal extradition
request, Egypt may not have considered itself bound by this treaty. See McGinley, supra note
4, at 717. However, the Hostages Convention, supra note 5, obligates Egypt either to prose-
cute suspected hostage takers or to extradite them to a country willing to prosecute them. See
supra text accompanying note 7.
49. Hijacking of the Achille Lauro, Statement by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary to
the President, October 9, 1985, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1221 (1985); see also Boyd,
Reagan Says U.S. Was Moving to Free People on Ship, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at A10, col.
1.
50. Schumacher, P.L.O. Says Cairo Gave It 48 Hours on Hijackers, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11,
1985, at A12, col. 1. The Egyptians' intention apparently was to turn the hijackers over to the
PLO with the expectation that that organization would try and punish them. See Miller, supra
note 44; Mubarak Denounces Interception ofAirliner by the U.S. as 'Piracy, N.Y. Times, Oct.
13, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 5 ("I thought it was better to send them to their leader to put them on
trial than to send them to Italy."). Reagan, at one point, appeared to accept the idea of a PLO
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evening, October 10, an Egyptian airliner carrying the four hijackers, two
Palestinian officials (Abbas and an unidentified PLO representative), and
several Egyptians took off from Cairo headed for Tunisia.
The Egyptian plane was denied permission to land first in Tunisia and
then in Athens. Instead, it was intercepted over the Mediterranean by
four American F-14 fighter planes, based on the aircraft carrier U.SS.
Saratoga, and directed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization base at
Sigonella, Sicily. After landing, the Egyptian aircraft was surrounded by
NATO troops.51 The original American plan was reportedly to trans-
port the hijackers to the United States almost immediately, but Italy in-
sisted that it was the proper country to try them and thus it retained
custody.5 2 Although Egypt accused Tunisia of colluding with the United
States in carrying out the interception,5 3 and Egypt itself was initially
widely suspected of being involved,54 the United States repeatedly denied
that any other country had knowledge of or assisted with the operation.55
III. Outcome
After the Egyptian plane and its American escorts landed in Sicily, a
conflict arose over the disposition of Abbas and the other Palestinian
official accompanying the hijackers. While Egyptian officials aboard the
intercepted plane agreed to turn over the four hijackers, they refused to
surrender the other two Palestinians. Egypt insisted that the two were its
guests and thus immune from investigation or arrest.5 6 Eventually, the
two officials were flown aboard the Egyptian airliner5 7 to Rome, where
trial, see Chicago, Illinois, Informal Exchange With Reporters, October 10, 1985, 21 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1222 (1985), but an hour later he stated that the U.S. would not support
such an outcome, Deerfield, Illinois, Informal Exchange With Reporters, October 10, 1985, 21
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1226 (1985). Mubarak later defended his proposal on the
grounds that it would have constituted a test for Arafat. "You Can Feel the Damage", TIME,
Oct. 28, 1985, at 26 (interview with Mubarak).
51. Clines, U.S. Heads Off the Hijackers: How the Operation Unfolded, N.Y. Times, Oct.
12, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
52. Italy: Andreotti Views Reprisal Prospects, FBIS (W. Eur.), Oct. 11, 1985, at L4 (text
from ANSA); Gwertzman, Standoff Reported Between Italy and Egypt on P.L.O. Escorts, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 12, 1985, at 5, col. 2.
53. Gwertzman, Mubarak Asserts Tunisia Colluded with US. over Jet, N.Y. Times, Oct.
21, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
54. Jubilant Justice (editorial), N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1985, at 26, col. I; Libya: Egyptian
Statement Shows Collusion in Interception, FBIS (Mid. East), Oct. 16, 1985, at Q2; Iran: Tui-
sia, Egypt Condemned, FBIS (S. Asia), Oct. 15, 1985, at 12 (text from Domestic Service); see
also Gwertzman, supra note 53. Interestingly, Iran also accused Arafat of being involved in
the interception plan. Iran: Egypt, Arafat Agreed with U.S., FBIS (S. Asia), Oct. 15, 1985, at
12 (text from International Service).
55. See Oct. 11 Press Conference, supra note 15, at 1237.
56. Gwertzman, supra note 52.




they stayed in the Egyptian Cultural Center.58 Meanwhile the four hi-
jackers were taken into civilian judicial custody.5 9 Egypt continued to
pressure Italy to release the two Palestinian officials, 60 but did not de-
mand the return of the hijackers. 61 On October 12, Abbas and the other
official flew on an Egyptian airliner to Yugoslavia, leaving Italy despite
the fact that the United States had previously issued an arrest warrant
and extradition request for Abbas.
62
The United States declared its intention to request extradition of the
hijackers from Italy at the same time it initially announced the intercep-
tion.63 An arrest warrant was issued by the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia on October 11 for Abbas and the four hijackers.64
Each was charged with hostage taking,65 piracy,6 6 and conspiracy to
commit both offenses. 67 Italy's decision to let Abbas go despite the war-
rants and extradition request was harshly criticized by the United
States. 68 The ensuing dispute within Italy over the decision led to the
collapse of Prime Minister Bettino Craxi's government. 69 However,
President Reagan quickly moved to repair any damage to U.S.-Italian
relations, 70 and Craxi was able to re-form a government from the same
coalition that had previously dissolved. 7'
58. Weinraub, Italy Said to Free 2 P.L.O. Aides Despite U.S. Arrest Warrant, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 13, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
59. Kamm, supra note 57.
60. Weinraub, supra note 58.
61. Tagliabue, Four Hijackers Charged by Italy with Murder and Kidnapping; 2 P.L.O.
Officials Taken to Rome, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
62. Weinraub, supra note 58. Abbas soon left Yugoslavia, reportedly for South Yemen.
Boyd, P.L.O. Says Aide, Sought by U.S., Leaves Yugoslavia, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1985, at A1,
col. 6.
63. Statement by Press Secretary, supra note 1, at 1234.
64. The warrant and criminal complaint are reproduced in 24 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS,
at 1554, 1555 (1985). The warrant identified the hijackers as Abdel Atif Ibrahim Fatayer,
Hallah Abdallah AI-Asan, Maged Yussef Al Malaki, and Hammad Al Abdulla.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (Supp. 11 1984).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982).
68. Hijacking of the Achille Lauro, Statement by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary to
the President on the Italian Government's Release of Abu el Abbas, October 13, 1985, 21
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1248 (1985) ("The U.S. Government finds it incomprehensible
that Italian authorities permitted Abu el Abbas to leave Italy .... "); see also Weinraub, supra
note 58; Boyd, supra note 62.
69. Dionne, Italian Government Collapses over the Achille Lauro Affair, N.Y. Times, Oct.
17, 1985, at Al, col. 5.
70. Dionne, President Sends Conciliatory Note to Italian Leader, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20,
1985, § 1, at 1, col 6.
71. 45 FACTS ON FILE, at 836 (1985).
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Italy charged the four arrested hijackers with murder, kidnapping, hi-
jacking, and possession of arms and explosives. 72 Thirteen individuals
were eventually indicted in connection with the hijacking-including
Abbas, who was accused of ordering the operation, and Ozzudin Badrak
Kan, who was identified as the other Palestinian official accompanying
the hijackers and the head of the PLF's military branch.73 Three of the
hijackers74 have been tried and convicted in Italy, receiving sentences of
15, 24, and 30 years. Abbas and two others tried in absentia were given
life sentences.
75
IV. Conflicting Conceptions of Lawfulness
Although Egypt. claimed that the U.S. action injured it,76 the primary
participants in the dispute over the legality of the interception were the
United States and the PLO. The PLO was the most directly affected by
the incident and potentially had the most to lose should the U.S. action
be accepted as lawful.
PLO spokesmen immediately asserted that the interception was illegit-
imate. Arafat termed the action "piracy" 77 and "terrorism. ' 78 Ibrahim
al-Sus, a PLO representative, stated that it was "in flagrant violation of
international law."' 79 A statement by the PLO Executive Committee ac-
cused the United States of a "flagrant aggression against Egypt and Arab
sovereignty." 80 The PLO's position seems to stem from its view that it
was the "only authority qualified to try" the hijackers."'
While the PLO attempted to rest its claim on a traditional conception
of a state's limited jurisdiction, the United States asserted a broad right
72. Taylor, Italy More Likely Than U.S. to Try Suspects in Hiacking of Cruise Vessel, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 12, 1985, at 5, col. 1.
73. Suro, Italy Seeks Trial in Ship Hjfacking, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1986, § 1, at 15, col. 1.
74. The fourth is awaiting trial as a juvenile.
75. Suro, Italian Jury Gives Cruise-Ship Killer 30-Year Sentence, N.Y. Times, July 11,
1986, at Al, col. 4. The prosecution has appealed, urging more severe sentences. Suro, Hi-
jacking Verdicts Appealed, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1986, at 3, col. 1.
76. Miller, U.S. Action Is Condemned by Cairo; Cruise Ship Is Held in Egyptian Port, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 12, 1985, at 4, col. 3.
77. Arafat Message to Craxi Warns of Reactions, FBIS (Mid. East), Oct. 12, 1985, at A4
(text from AFP (Paris)).
78. Arafat Says Interception Showed 'Cowboy Logic, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985. § 1, at 21,
col. 1.
79. PLO Reacts to Interception, FBIS (Mid. East), Oct. 11, 1985, at AI (text from AFP
(Paris)).
80. PLO Statement, FBIS (Mid. East), Oct. 12, 1985, at AI (text from Voice of PLO).
81. PLO Reacts to Interception, supra note 79. Such a trial by the PLO would of course be
difficult since there is no Palestinian state and no Palestinian nationals. However, the General
Assembly and a number of states have recognized the PLO as the representative of the Pales-
tinian people. In 1975 the PLO announced the adoption of a criminal code to punish Palestini-
ans. See McGinley, supra note 4, at 716.
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to apprehend "terrorists" wherever possible. In a speech to the North
Atlantic Assembly, Secretary of State George Shultz announced that the
United States would not be inhibited by definitions of legality in its ef-
forts to track down and capture terrorists:
We [the nations of the North Atlantic Assembly] are law-abiding countries.
However, we don't want to... allow our tendencies, our desire to be law-
abiding, to stand by our principles, to be used by terrorists, and to allow
them to use fear as a key to the jailhouse door....
So we have to be willing to take action and not be afraid to do so. It has
to be a proper action, and I think that we saw an illustration a few days ago
when President Reagan ordered our planes to bring that plane in to the
Sigonella Airport. That was action.
82
Similarly, President Reagan stated that the key consideration in this
incident was that "here was a clear-cut case in which we could lay our
hands on the terrorists" without danger to "many innocent people."'83
The President stated that his aim was to "sen[d] a message to terrorists
everywhere,. . . You can run but you can't hide."'8 4 Thus, the United
States' position appears to be that where suspected terrorists can be iden-
tified and apprehended without great danger to others, it has the right to
take such action regardless of "legal" considerations.8 5
V. International Appraisal
Because of the highly dramatic character of the United States' inter-
ception, itself the climax to a hostage crisis watched by a large part of the
world, this incident received a great deal of international attention and
comment. As might be expected, the most sustained reaction occurred in
Egypt. The initial governmental response was markedly restrained. A
Foreign Ministry statement released immediately after the interception
said that Egypt "greatly regrets" the U.S. act and noted that "such ac-
tions do not serve the peace process ' 86 Although President Mubarak
82. Remarks and Question and Answer Session by the Honorable George P. Shultz, Secre-
tary of State, Before the North Atlantic Assembly, St. Francis Hotel, San Francisco, Califor-
nia, October 14, 1985, U.S. Dept. of State, Press Release No. 246, at 20.
83. Oct. I1 Press Conference, supra note 15, at 1236.
84. Id. at 1235.
85. Accounts of the decision-making process behind the interception, see. e.g., Green-
burger & Seib, Euphoria After the Capture of Hijackers by U.S. Isn't Expected to Survive New
Wave of Terror, Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 1985, at 2, col. 2, while revealing that questions of the
mission's military risks were raised, do not report any discussion of the action's legitimacy
under international law. Moreover, in the weeks following this incident, the U.S. made no
attempt explicitly to justify the interception as being legitimate under international law. Mc-
Ginley, supra note 4, at 721.
86. Egypt: Reportage on Conclusion of Cruise Ship Hiacking: Foreign Ministry Statement,
FBIS (Mid. East), Oct. 11, 1985, at D2 (text from MENA). The statement further character-
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later termed the action "piracy" and "impermissible under any interna-
tional law or norm," his reaction was primarily one of surprise and hurt
that the United States would treat "a friend" in such a way. 87 The Egyp-
tian press was more blatantly critical, but echoed the President's theme
that the Egyptian people took the U.S. action as a personal insult.88 In-
deed, Mubarak did not demand that the United States return the hijack-
ers,8 9 as one might expect if the perceived injury was a trespass on his
nation's sovereignty, but instead insisted on an "apology... addressed to
all Egyptians and not only to him personally." 90
The rest of the Arab world was also critical of the U.S. mission. How-
ever, while the Middle East press was unanimous and explicit in its con-
demnation, 91 only Iran,92 Iraq,93 the Sudan,94 and Kuwait 95 issued direct
governmental comments, and the latter two were markedly low-keyed
ized the incident by noting: "terrorism leads to more terrorism,... violence generates more
violence." Id.
87. Egypt: Mubarak Reacts to US. Interception of Airliner, FBIS (Mid. East), Oct. 15,
1985, at D1 (text from MENA). Mubarak stated that the interception was "unexpected" and
that he was "deeply wounded and deeply pained." Id. See also Mubarak Denounces Intercep-
tion ofAirliner by the U.S. as 'Piracy" N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 5. Mubarak's
subsequent pronouncements were widely seen as primarily a reaction to domestic political
considerations. See Miller, Mubarak Reaction Reflects Egypt's Political Climate, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 14, 1985, at All, col. 1; Rogg, Police Rout Demonstrators on Egyptian Campus, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 20, 1985, § 1, at 17, col. 1.
88. See Egypt: Media Denounce U.S. Interception of Plane, FBIS (Mid. East), Oct. 15,
1985, at D8-D10 (texts from Cairo Domestic Service, AI-Jumhuriyah, Voice of the Arabs,
Cairo Radio); see also Gwertzman, The U.S. May Pay a High Price for Its Triumph, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 20, 1985, § 4, at 1, col. 1 ("Egypt, which is as sensitive as any country to a per-
ceived slight, viewed the interception less as a victory over terrorists than as an attack on their
own national dignity.").
89. While Egypt asked Italy to let the two PLO representatives depart freely, it made no
such request concerning the four hijackers. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
90. Egypt: Mubarak Demands U.S. Apology to Egyptian People, FBIS (Mid. East), Oct. 16,
1985, at Dl (text from AI-Ahram, International Edition); see also Kifner, Mubarak, Furious at
U.S., Demands a Public Apology, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1985, at A10, col. 1. Mubarak's re-
sponse was criticized by both the opposition press and the state-influenced national press for
being too mild. Miller, supra note 87.
91. See, e.g., Bahrain: Al-Adwa' Says US. Plane Interception 'Overt Piracy, FBIS (Mid.
East), Oct. 15, 1985, at CI; Kuwait: A1-Anba'Says US. Ready for 'Terrorist Aggressions', FBIS
(Mid. East), Oct. 15, 1985, at Cl; Qatar: Dailies Criticize U.S. Over Egyptian Plane Affair,
FBIS (Mid. East), Oct. 15, 1985, at C2 (text from WAKH); Saudi Arabia: 'UKAZ: US. Act
Against Egyptian Plane 'Piracy', FBIS (Mid. East), Oct. 15, 1985, at C2; U.A.E. At-Ittihad
Criticizes U.S. on Plane Interception, FBIS (Mid. East), Oct. 15, 1985, at C4; PDYR [S.
Yemen]: U.S. Interception of Plane Terrorist Action, FBIS (Mid. East), Oct. 11, 1985, at C3
(text from Domestic Service), Jordan: U.S. Intercept of Plane Called 'Cowboy Diplomacy',
FBIS (Mid. East), Oct. 15, 1985, at F4 (text from Al-Ra'y); Syria: Comment oil Ship Hi-
jacking, Plane Diversion, FBIS (Mid. East), Oct. 15, 1985, at HI (text from Domestic Service);
Algeria: U.S. Defense Secretary Confirms U.S. 'Terrorism', FBIS (Mid. East), Oct. 15, 1985, at
Q1 (text from Domestic Service); see also Hijazi, Arab Papers Assert U.S. Embarrrassed Its
Friends, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1985, at All, col. 4. Most of these editorials compared the U.S.
action with the recent Israeli raid on the base in Tunisia, some asking: Where were the Ameri-
can interceptors then? See e.g., Jordan. supra.
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and restrained.96 Notably, King Hussein of Jordan, when offered the op-
portunity to criticize the U.S. action, expressly declined to do so.
97
In contrast to this Arab condemnation, the United States' allies gener-
ally supported the interception. But despite the allies' overall approval,
some tempered their praise of the result with questions about whether
the action was in fact legal. Not surprisingly, the most immediate and
pronounced support came from Israel.98 The U.S. move was interpreted
to mean that Israel was "no longer alone in the war against terrorism." 99
America's European allies were also supportive. British Foreign Secre-
tary Geoffrey Howe "applauded" the interception and stated that there
was "no reason" to question its legality. 100 Similarly, Italian Prime Min-
ister Craxi "rejected ... the idea that the military action.., was an act of
92. Iran: Valayati: Act of U.S. Terrorism, FBIS (S. Asia), Oct. 15, 1985, at I1 (text from
Domestic Service) (statement by Foreign Minister Valayati: "the most blatant and disgraceful
form of governmental terrorism").
93. Iraq: Foreign Ministry Statement on U.S. Interception, FBIS (Mid. East), Oct. 15,
1985, at E3 (text from Voice of the Masses).
94. Sudan: Government Denounces Interception of Egyptian Plane, FBIS (Mid. East), Oct.
15, 1985, at Q4 (text from SUNA) (statement by Dr. Amin Makki Makani, Counsel of Minis-
ters Official Spokesman).
95. Kuwait: U.S. Actions 'Complicate' Mideast Situation, FBIS (Mid. East), Oct. 15, 1985,
at Cl (text from KUNA).
96. For example, the Sudan's spokesperson termed the interception "not productive" and
likely to "lead to stalemate in peace efforts" and stated that it "conflicts with international
norms and charters." Sudan, supra note 94; see also Kuwait, supra note 95.
Syria, while making no official comment, reportedly abandoned its diplomatic efforts on
behalf of the American hostages held in Lebanon. This move was said to be in protest of the
U.S. interception. Hijazi, Syria Is Said to Abandon Bid to Gain Americans' Release, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 21, 1985, at A6, col. 5.
97. Jordan: Details of King's CBS TV Interview Reported, FBIS (Mid. East), Oct. 18,
1985, at F2 (text from Domestic Service).
98. See, e.g., Israel: Peres Praises Reagan, Schultz, FBIS (Mid. East), Oct. 11, 1985, at I1
(text from Domestic Service) ("a landmark in the struggle against terrorism").
99. Israel: Peres Reiterates Appreciation for U.S. Action, FBIS (Mid. East), Oct. 15, 1985,
at 16 (text from Domestic Service) (statement of Prime Minister Shimon Peres); see also Israel:
Rabin on Effects on Peace Process, FBIS (Mid. East), Oct. 11, 1985, at 112 (text from IDF
Radio) (statement of Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin: the U.S. "has joined us in initiating
action against terrorism").
100. UK: Howe Praises U.S. Action Against Hiackers, FBIS (W. Eur.), Oct. 11, 1985, at
QI (text from Press Association). Howe explained his reasoning concerning the action's legal-
ity in the following terms:
If you think of the object of the conventions against terrorism, they place an obligation on
states concerned to see that people are either prosecuted or extradited and that is clearly
the object of what happened here. The important thing is, the effect of what has happened
is that the terrorists will face trial in a court of law. That would never have happened, it
seems, if this action had not been taken.
Id. But see McFadden, Many U.S. Allies Applaud Move, But Some Question Its Legality, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 12, 1985, at 7, col. I (statement of Social Democratic leader and former Labor
Party Foreign Secretary David Owen) ("International terrorism, abhorrent as it is, cannot
justify states violating international law, whatever the provocation, whatever the frustration.").
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piracy."101 While neither the West German nor the French governments
issued official statements, 10 2 the reactions of the press in both countries
were generally favorable.103 Outside of Europe, the Prime Ministers of
Canada' 04 and Australia'05 expressed approval of the interception, while
Japan withheld official comment.106
Interestingly, several commentators in Western countries expressed
the view that the interception violated international law but at the same
time praised the action. For example, an Israeli editorial commented:
"Technically, Washington did violate international law. However, it
abided by its spirit to make sure justice was done."' 0 7 On the same note,
Le Monde asked: "Was Ronald Reagan right or wrong to violate inter-
national law by using his air force to intercept the Egyptian plane... ?
The question can be asked. The answer is obvious: We are bound to
approve the U.S. President's action. [Otherwise the terrorists would
have escaped.]"' 08 The Economist stated that "[t]he Americans almost
certainly flouted international law," but concluded that because "this
high-handed action was the only way of bringing the men to justice...
the Americans were morally right...." 1o 9 The effect of an incident on
legal norms is ultimately a function of what relevant elites ate willing to
accept as legitimate. Thus, in analyzing this view of the U.S. action-"it
violated international law but it's O.K."-the conclusion that the result
101. Italy: Craxi Press Conference, FBIS (W. Eur.), Oct. 15, 1985, at LI (text from Do-
mestic Service). Elsewhere, while stating that he considered the U.S. mission "a great suc-
cess," Craxi admitted that Italy had "assisted in an action or a sequence of unorthodox
events." Tagliabue, supra note 61.
102. See McFadden, supra note 100. Officials from several European governments noted
that they were withholding comment partially because they were unsure of the action's legal-
ity. Id.
103. See FRG: Press Views U.S. Action Against Hiackers, FBIS (W. Eur.), Oct. 16, 1985,
at J5 (texts from Die Welt and Stuttgarter Nachrichten); France: Le Monde Backs Intercep-
tion of Plane Carrying Hijackers, FBIS (W. Eur.), Oct. 16, 1985, at K3. The N.Y. Times
reported "overwhelming support" for the interception among the people of Western Europe.
McFadden, supra note 100.
104. McFadden, supra note 100.
105. Australia: Bowen Supports U.S. Action Over Hijacked Ship, FBIS (Asia & Pacific),
Oct. 15, 1985, at M1 (text from Overseas Service); Australia: Message Expresses 'Sympathy'
With U.S. Action, FBIS (Asia & Pacific), Oct. 16, 1985, at MI (text from Overseas Service).
106. McFadden, supra note 100.
107. Israel: Papers WIlcone Capture of PLO Hiackers, FBIS (Mid. East), Oct. 15, 1985,
at 113 (text from Davar).
108. France, supra note 103.
109. It's a Jungle Out There, THE EcONOMIST, Oct. 19, 1985, at 13; see also Truck with




was praiseworthy is much more important than the caveat that the law
was technically broken.' 10
Finally, the reaction of the Soviet Union and its allies was critical, but
surprisingly mild. Newspapers in Poland,"' Czechoslovakia," 12 Bulga-
ria," t3 and Cuba 14 all condemned the interception, but they did so in
muted tones. Like many Middle East commentators, several drew the
comparison between the U.S. action and Israel's raid on Tunisia." 5 The
Soviet response was more restrained still. Tass's initial report called
American anger over the hijacking and murder "understandable and
just.' 1 6 It went on to comment: "The crimes of terrorists, no matter
where they are committed, must be punished most severely, and such
severity must be shown unfailingly to all perpetrators of such crimes.""
7
The Soviets chided the United States for hypocrisy, however, pointing
out that the U.S. had granted asylum to two Lithuanians who hijacked
an Aeroflot plane and killed a flight attendant in 1970.'18 Some specu-
lated that this Soviet sympathy was a product of the fact that the Rus-
sians were in the midst of their own Middle East hostage crisis.119
110. This seeming contradiction highlights the fact that in international law, practice is
often more determinative of legality than authoritative text. See Reisman, International Inci-
dents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of International Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 2
(1984) ("[TMhe normative expectations of those who are politically effective in the world com-
munity... are not derived from international judgments or from constitutional documents,
statutes, or treaties. They are almost entirely derived from the responses of key actors to a
critical event.").
111. Poland: Reagan Seen as "Man Who Fights Terrorism", FBIS (E. Eur.), Oct. 11, 1985,
at G1 (text from Domestic Service); Poland: U.S. Uses "Kidnappers' " Methods on Egypt
Airliner, FBIS (E. Eur.), Oct. 15, 1985, at G8 (text from PAP).
112. Czechoslovakia: U.S. Commits 'Act of Piracy' on Egyptian Plane, FBIS (E. Eur.), Oct.
15, 1985, at D1 (text from International Service); Czechoslovakia: Mideast Crisis, Arms Race
Worsened by U.S., FBIS (E. Eur.), Oct. 16, 1985, at D2 (text from Domestic Service) ("The
annoyance and the exasperation of the Americans are understandable, but to respond to crime
by carrying out another crime is certainly not in compliance with international law.").
113. Bulgaria: BCP Daily on Achille Lauro 'Revenge'Aftermath, FBIS (E. Eur.), Oct. 23,
1985, at Cl (text from Rabotnichesko Delo).
114. Cuba: Commentary Views Mideast, Achille Lauro Incident, FBIS (Latin Am.), Oct.
17, 1985, at Ql (text from International Service).
115. Poland: "Kidnappers'" Methods, supra note 11; Czechoslovakia: Mideast Crisis,
supra note 112; Bulgaria, supra note 113.
116. From Soviet, Sympathy and a Barb for the U.S., N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1985, at 7, col.
5; see also Rejoinders Criticize Reagan Statement on Terrorism, FBIS (USSR), Oct. 16, 1985, at
Al (text from Tass).
117. From Soviet, Sympathy and a Barb for the U.S., supra note 116.
118. Id. For further Soviet commentaries along the same lines, see 37 THE CURRENT
Dwis'r 01: THE SovrET PRiSS, at 16-18 (1985).
119. Perspectives on the Achille Lauro Affair, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, § 4. at I. col. 3.
Three Soviet embassy employees were then being held in Beirut by fundamentalist Moslems.
A fourth Russian hostage had been killed the week before. Taubman, Moscow Identifies Body
in Lebanon as a Russian Aide, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1985, at A1, col. 6. Whatever the motives
behind the Soviets' reaction, their lack of criticism was itself harshly criticized. See Iran:
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In addition to these direct expressions of support or criticism, several
events which occurred in the days following the interception may shed
light on how the international community evaluated the incident. The
PLO, and Arafat in particular, was handed a number of setbacks soon
after the American action. On October 14, Britain cancelled, at the last
minute, a planned high-level meeting with a Palestinian and Jordanian
delegation that included two PLO representatives.120 States in the Mid-
dle East also backed away from the PLO: Jordan publicly supported
London's version of its reason for cancelling the aforementioned meet-
ing; 2 1 and Syria announced its discovery of, and then turned over to the
United States, the body of Klinghoffer, which had washed up on its
shore.12 2 Both actions were seen as calculated rebuffs to Arafat. 123 In
Tunisia, government officials hinted that the PLO headquarters might
not be welcome there much longer12 4 and that Abbas would not be al-
lowed back into the country, where the PLF, like the PLO, was based. 125
And, on the same day that Britain cancelled its Palestinian meeting,
United Nations members who intended to sponsor a General Assembly
resolution inviting Arafat to the upcoming fortieth anniversary com-
memoration agreed to drop their efforts. 126 Of course, the U.S. intercep-
tion was not the immediate impetus for any of these events. 127
Nonetheless, each occurred in the context of the American action; it is
difficult to believe that Arafat would have suffered this striking string of
setbacks had these states strongly supported the PLO position on the
interception. Finally, the fact that most international elites at least tac-
itly supported the U.S. action is indicated by the fact that no attempt was
USSR Support of U.S. Hjacking Noted, Criticized, FBIS (S. Asia), Oct. 16, 1985, at II (text
from Domestic Service).
120. Thomas, Britain Calls Off a Meeting With Jordan-Palestine Unit, N.Y. Times, Oct.
15, 1985, at A12, col. 5.
121. Friedman, supra note 47.
122. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
123. Friedman, supra note 47.
124. Schumacher, Tunisians Reported at Odds on Letting the P.L.O. Stay, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 17, 1985, at A13, col. 1. On October 8, 1986, the PLO announced that it was moving its
headquarters from Tunis, reportedly because of strains between it and the Tunisian govern-
ment. Kifner, PLO Moving from Tunis to Yemen, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1986, at A3, col. 1.
125. Schumacher, Tunisian Officials Leaving Doubt Whether Palestinian Can Return, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 20, 1985, § 1, at 18, col. 1.
126. Sciolino, U.N., Facing Boycott Threat, Drops Effort to Invite Arafat, N.Y. Times, Oct.
15, 1985, at Al, col. 5.
127. For example, Syria and Jordan each, for opposite reasons, had been growing increas-
ingly "fed up" with Arafat's policies and actions vis-A-vis Israel. Friedman, supra note 47.
Great Britain reneged on its invitation because one of the PLO representatives refused to sign
an agreed-upon statement recognizing Israel's right to exist. Arafat's Ship of Fools, THr
ECONOMIs-r, Oct. 19, 1985, at 57.
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made to bring the issue before the U.N. Security Council, nor was the
subject ever directly raised in the General Assembly.
VI. Writer's Appraisal
On the whole, the United States was acquitted in the court of interna-
tional opinion. The final verdict seems to be that the scourge of interna-
tional terrorism requires extraordinary action, and, at least where
successful, countries that take action to capture those who have unam-
biguously committed acts of terrorism 128 will not be condemned.
Although many were unwilling to grant its "legality," nearly all Western
countries ultimately supported the U.S. action. 129 Except in the Arab
world, where the concern was not so much with legality as with honor,
the United States suffered no adverse consequences as a result of the in-
terception. Even in the Middle East, the long-term effects appear to be
minimal. Thus, as a result of the U.S. action, the previous norm against
the interception of civilian aircraft has been modified. The interception
of the Achille Lauro hijackers ultimately must be considered a legal act.
It is also necessary, however, to consider a subsequent event to discover
the precise contours of this new norm.
So successful was the U.S. action that its example was soon followed.
On February 4, 1986, Israeli military planes intercepted a small Libyan
jet flying over the Mediterranean towards Damascus and forced it to land
in Israel.130 The Israelis were looking for Palestinian terrorists whom
they believed had boarded the plane after having attended a Palestinian
conference in Tripoli, Libya. 31 After discovering that the only passen-
gers on board were seven Syrian politicians and two pro-Syrian Lebanese
128. The generally favorable reaction of international elites to the U.S. interception was
undoubtedly influenced by the unusual degree to which the hijackers were isolated from any
support within the international community. Even the PLO disavowed and criticized the hi-
jacking. Hijazi, Arabs Renouncing Seizure of Vessel, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at A12, col. 1;
Italy: Hijackers Threaten to Kill Americans, FBIS (W. Eur.), Oct. 8, 1985, at Li (text from
Paris AFP).
129. It may be asserted that this perhaps curious combination of support for the intercep-
tion and hesitancy to endorse its legality exhibited by a number of Western elites indicates a
desire to reinforce the preexisting norm even where the immediate outcome-the apprehension
of four terrorists-was agreeable. In other words: the end justified the means this time, but
don't do it again. However, the reaction to Israel's subsequent similar action, see infra text
accompanying notes 130-37, leads me to conclude that these elites accepted the weakening of
the norm against the interception of civilian aircraft despite their rhetorical reservations con-
cerning legality, see supra note 110 and accompanying text.
130. Friedman, Israelis Intercept a Libyan Civil Jet and Then Let It Go, N.Y. Times, Feb.
5, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
131. Interestingly, one of the Palestinians suspected of being on board was George Hab-
bash, whom the Israelis unsuccessfully sought to apprehend by the same method in 1973. See
supra note 30 and accompanying text.
Yale Journal of International Law
militia officials, the Israelis let the plane fly on to Damascus. 132
Although the precedent for the Israeli action was as much its previous
similar attempt of August 1973133 as the Achille Lauro response, it may
be surmised that had the reaction to the latter been more negative, the
Israeli interception would not have taken place.'
34
The extent to which the Achille Lauro incident modified the norm
against the interception of civilian aircraft can be seen by comparing the
Security Council's actions following Israel's 1973 interception with the
aftermath of this latest attempt. While the Security Council unani-
mously condemned the former attempt, the United States vetoed a simi-
lar resolution in February 1986.135 The U.S. representative, Vernon
Walters, criticized the Israeli action on the grounds that there was insuf-
ficient evidence that terrorists were on the plane, but was unwilling to
allow the proposed resolution to be adopted. Walters stated the U.S.
position as follows:
As a general principle the United States opposes the interception of civil
aircraft.... At the same time, we believe that there may arise exceptional
circumstances in which an interception may be justified.
We believe a State should intercept a civilian aircraft only on the basis of
the strongest and clearest evidence that terrorists are aboard.... [B]ecause
we believe that the ability to take such action in carefully defined and lim-
ited circumstances is an aspect of the inherent right of self-defence recog-
nized in the United Nations Charter, my Government cannot accept a draft
resolution which implies that interception of an aircraft is wrongful per
se. 1
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Likewise, none of the U.S. allies in the Security Council voted to con-
demn Israel this time. Australia, Denmark, France, and Britain all ab-
stained. While none supported the Israeli action, each criticized the
132. Friedman, supra note 130. An Israeli official implied that the only difference between
this action and the U.S. interception was that the latter was successful: "What can I say?...
We went fishing and we didn't catch the fish. The people we thought would be on board were
not there. It is a pity because we were going after some biggies, and if we would have caught
them the world would have applauded." Id.
133. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
134. Analysts implied that this opinion was held by many Middle East elites, See Muir,
Arabs Rally in Face of Perceived U.S. Role in Israel's Seizure of Jet, Christian Sci. Mon., Feb.
6, 1986, at 11, col. 4.
135. U.N. Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2655th Meeting, S/
PV.2655 at 114 (Feb. 6, 1986) [hereinafter Security Council, 2655th Meeting].
136. Id. at 112-13; see also statement of U.S. Secretary of State Shultz before a conference
in January 1986: "A nation attacked by terrorists is permitted to use force to prevent or
preempt future attacks, to seize terrorists, or to rescue its citizens when no other means is




resolution for not recognizing the special problem of terrorism to which
Israel was responding. 137
Thus, it appears that, at least as far as Western elites are concerned, a
civilian aircraft in flight will no longer be considered a sanctuary when
there is strong evidence that suspected terrorists are aboard. 138 The
norm against interception has not been modified because of any change
in the objectives which undergirded it; the concern for the protection of
civilian aviation has not diminished. Instead, the problem of terrorism,
particularly in Western Europe and the Middle East, has created a con-
sensus that extraordinary measures are necessary and that the luxury of
holding aircraft inviolable can no longer be afforded.
While the international response to the U.S. interception was primarily
a function of this view that terrorism is a special problem, and within this
context the act must be considered to have been legal, the claim put for-
ward by the United States ultimately goes beyond the legitimacy of this
particular act and concerns more than the question of how to deal with
terrorism. More than being merely an effort to change the rules regard-
ing the apprehension of criminals outside a state's territory, the Achille
Lauro incident manifests a position developing within the United States
which denies the proscriptive competence of international law over a
broader range than had heretofore been asserted. Not only is the United
States unwilling to be handcuffed by rigid claims of legality; 139 where it
sees its security interests implicated, the United States asserts the right to
act unilaterally, subject to no external legal constraints.
The connection between the Achille Lauro response and other recent
uses of force by the United States was made explicit soon after the inter-
ception. In explaining the Reagan administration's decision to withdraw
137. See, ag., statement of French representative:
That act was clearly contrary to the rules of international law.... However, that action
was taken in a particular context, the context of serious acts of terrorism recently perpe-
trated in several European countries. . . . In these circumstances, the case before the
Council cannot be assessed in the usual manner. That is why... France is not able to
support the text, which includes formulations that do not seem to reflect the precise facts
of the situation.
Security Council, 2655th Meeting, supra note 135, at 111; see also id. at 115-20 (statements of
representatives of Denmark, Australia, and United Kingdom).
138. The implications of this state of affairs for air safety was noted by the Christian Sci-
ence Monitor: "EA]re civilian passengers now to be subjected to the risks of counterterrorist
commandeering by air force jets of vigilante nations as well as to commandeering by terrorists
... ?" Narrowing the Lanes of Conflict (editorial), Christian Sci. Mon., Feb. 7, 1986, at 17, col.
1.
139. See supra text accompanying note 82 (statement of Secretary Shultz).
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from the World Court's compulsory jurisdiction,140 Abraham Sofaer, the
Legal Adviser to the State Department, testified:
[W]ould the Court be the proper forum for resolving disputes that gave rise
to such actions as the Berlin airlift, the Cuban missile crisis, and most re-
cently our diversion of the Achille Lauro terrorists? Each event involved
questions of international law. At the same time, however, at stake on each
occasion were interests of a fundamentally political nature, going to our na-
tion's security. Such matters cannot be left for resolution by judicial means,
let alone by a court such as the ICJ; rather they are the ultimate responsibili-
ties assigned by our constitution to the President and Congress. 
141
Clearly, the claim is that in cases involving the "nation's security" the
United States may act subject only to domestic law. Although interna-
tional law may be implicated, it is controlling only where security con-
cerns-as defined by the U.S.-are not present.14
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Thus, the Achille Lauro incident cannot be understood fully if consid-
ered to be simply a response to terrorism; it is more fundamentally part
of a general claim by the United States regarding the limits of interna-
tional law. While the U.S. was primarily responsible for the creation of
the post-World War II international legal regime, it has now determined
that the constraints imposed by this regime on the unilateral use of force
are largely unacceptable. The U.S. claim is not a rejection of interna-
tional law in general, but a limitation of it to areas not affecting "our
nation's security." Indeed, an expansive interpretation of Article 51 of
140. It is a notable coincidence that theAchille Lauro interception occurred the same week
that the U.S. announced that it would no longer accept the I.C.J.'s compulsory jurisdiction.
See Weinraub, U.S. Limits Its Role At Court In Hague, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at A5, col. 1.
141. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1985) (emphasis added).
Compare this with the statement of the United States representative to the U.N. explaining the
U.S. vote for the Security Council resolution condemning Israel after its August 1973
interception:
Today we have taken an important step towards the reaffirmation of the rule of law in
international civil aviation. Let me repeat what I said in this chamber on Tuesday: "Na-
tional and international efforts to control terrorism must go forward. They must, how-
ever, go forward within and not outside of law."
28 U.N. SCOR (1740th mtg.) at % 49, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1740 (1973).
142. The U.S. priorities were made clear in an interview with President Reagan shortly
after the interception:
Q. Mr. President, would you do it [interdict terrorists] again, even if it meant, say, violat-
ing international law?
The President. [Y]ou'd have to judge each case on its own as to the need to bring ter-
rorists to justice .... So, you would have to judge that against how much you would be
violating international law to achieve your goal.
Q. But, if it was necessary, I take it you would.
The President. Yes.
Foreign Issues, Interview with Brian Widlake of the British Broadcasting Corporation, Oct.
29, 1985, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1318, 1322 (1985).
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the U.N. Charter is often invoked to justify this position. 143 Nonetheless,
this denial of international law's relevance over so great an area is neces-
sarily destructive of the legal regime itself.
The Achille Lauro incident-whether seen as limited to the modifica-
tion of the norm against the interception of civilian aircraft, or more
broadly as indicative of a claim regarding the limits of international
law-will ultimately have undesirable consequences for world public or-
der. One cost of per se rules is that they are often overinclusive: they
proscribe certain conduct even when its occurrence, looked at ex post,
would be desirable. However, such rules are more easily defined and
communicated and therefore more likely to be observed. This advantage
is particularly important in the international legal system because of that
system's inherent obstacles to rule-making, communication, and enforce-
ment. Thus, while a set of norms that allow for exceptions, such as that
which legitimated the U.S. interception, may constitute "better" law, it is
not to be preferred if it results in a less stable legal regime. Given this
fact, I do not believe that the United States' Achille Lauro "victory" fur-
thers its long-term interests. Although the constraints imposed by super-
national law may sometimes chafe, it is precisely a superpower, with va-
ried global interests and a need for international stability, which has the
most to gain from that law's existence. In this context, it is noteworthy
that immediately after the U.S. interception, a number of "radical Pales-
tinian spokesmen and unidentified callers telephoned Western news agen-
cies in Beirut and elsewhere, vowing to retaliate for the American
retaliation, which was for the Palestinian retaliation on the Achille
Lauro, which was for the Israeli retaliation in Tunis, which was for the
Palestinian retaliation in Cyprus." 144 In an international order governed
merely by the law of the jungle, the survival guaranteed by strength may
be precarious indeed.
143. See, e.g., Rostow, Nicaragua and the Law of Self-Defense Revisited, I 1 YALE J. INT'L
L. 437, 449-53 (1986); supra text accompanying note 136 (statement of representative
Walters).
144. Friedman, Hgackers in Custody: A Special Satisfaction for Israel and U.S., N.Y.
Times, Oct. 12, 1985, at 10, col. 1.
